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Humanitarian Intervention
Ivan Shearer
he Russian Orthodox Church recently canonized the last Czar of Rus-
sia, Nicholas II. A fantasy of mine is that the Church will at some point
also consider for sainthood (assuming his private life met appropriate stan-
dards) the czar’s legal adviser, Baron Feodor de Martens, who was responsible
for the wording of what has come down to us as the “Martens Clause.”
As it first appeared in the Preamble to the Second Hague Convention of
1899, the Martens Clause reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high contracting
parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience.1
In common articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Martens
Clause is substantially repeated, with the substitution of the word “dictates”
1. Preamble, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, U.S.T.S. 403, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
for “requirements” in relation to the public conscience.2 The Clause also ap-
pears in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.3
The Martens Clause is a powerful reminder that in situations of armed con-
flict, of whatever kind, there is never a total gap in the law, never a situation in
which there cannot be an appeal to law in order to mitigate the horror and the
suffering. Baron de Martens correctly foresaw in 1899, and again in 1907, that
unscrupulous commanders and their cunning legal advisers might seek to ex-
ploit loopholes or ambiguities in the written law. An egregious example is the
“general participation clause” of the Hague Conventions of 1907, according
to which the provisions of the Conventions did not apply to any of the
belligerents unless all of them were parties to the Conventions. Thus, the de-
tailed Hague Regulations might not apply but, according to the Martens
Clause, standards of civilized behavior deriving from custom, humanity and
the public conscience do.
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2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 63, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 197 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed., 2000)
[hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, Article
142, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, id. at 222 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 142, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, id. at 244 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Article 158, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, id. at 301 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, Article 1(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, id.
at 422 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12,
1977, Preamble, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, id. at 483 [hereinafter Protocol II].
I take this as my starting point in the discussion of the jus in bello in relation
to humanitarian intervention operations.4 Whatever may be the uncertainties
in the identification and application of this law to a relatively new form of
armed conflict, at least we can be confident that we start from a firm, albeit
general, basis in humanitarian law. That basis is indeed becoming more de-
tailed in content as consensus emerges that certain principles and rules of the
jus in bello have achieved recognized status in customary law. Note should be
taken in this regard of ongoing discussions in Geneva to identify those parts of
Protocol I that may be regarded as customary, notwithstanding the inability of
certain States to ratify the Protocol by reason of particular objections.5
The other firm foundation for my approach is that the application of the jus
in bello is not dependent upon the demonstration of a legal basis for the resort
to armed force in the jus ad bellum. The law of armed conflict (which term I re-
gard as including international humanitarian law) applies its protection
equally to the just and the unjust sides to a conflict. This is an established and
undoubted proposition.
What is “Intervention”?
We may consider first a number of actions that constitute (for the most
part) non-forcible and thus uncontroversial forms of intervention. These are
sometimes listed under the heading “Military Operations Other than War”
(MOOTW) and include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, peace
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4. Some recent literature on the topic includes: Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, THE BLUE
HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATION OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS (1996);
Daphna Shraga and Ralph Zacklin, The applicability of international humanitarian law to UN
peacekeeping operations: conceptual, legal and practical issues, in SYMPOSIUM ON HUMANITARIAN
ACTION AND PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS (Umesh Palwankar, ed., 1994); Willy Lubin,
Towards the international responsibility of the UN in human rights violations during peace-keeping
operations: the case of Somalia, 52 BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS
47 (1994); Julianne Peck, Note: The UN and the Laws of War: How Can the World’s Peacekeepers
Be Held Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
283 (1995); Brian Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International Humanitarian
Law to UN Peace Operations, 33 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1997); Garth
Cartledge, Legal constraints on military personnel deployed on peace-keeping operations, in THE
CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW (Helen Durham and Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 1999).
5. Yoram Dinstein, The Thirteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law, 166 MILITARY
LAW REVIEW 93 (2000).
operations, arms control, military support to the civil authorities, enforcement
of sanctions, foreign internal defense, counter-drug operations, evacuation of
noncombatants, hostage rescue, and others.6 The law applicable to such oper-
ations consists principally of the norms of human rights, as recognized in the
major international covenants and conventions, and established as general in-
ternational law. The domestic law of the country where the intervention takes
place will also call for respect, except in so far as it may conflict with estab-
lished international human rights law or the provisions of a higher law, such as
a resolution of the United Nations Security Council.
Some of these examples may, of course, in the circumstances, involve the
use of armed force or grow through “mission creep” to require the use of armed
force. A hostage rescue almost certainly requires the use of armed force, but
the swiftness of the insertion and withdrawal of force hardly allows for the ap-
plication of the law of armed conflict as such: only the general principles of
proportionality and humanity guide us here. Lengthier presences, such as the
operation in Somalia, may come to pose questions of the applicability of the
laws of armed conflict as the situation escalates from a peaceable and unop-
posed intervention to armed conflict. A peacekeeping operation authorized by
the United Nations may envisage the necessity of the use of force beyond the
elementary right of UN forces to defend themselves against armed attack.7
These are sometimes referred to as “robust” peacekeeping operations. This
type of operation also raises the question of application of the laws of armed
conflict.
Finally, intervention may be avowedly a forcible action—a peace enforce-
ment action usually authorized by the UN Security Council (as in the case of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), but in certain cases not authorized by it (as in the
case of the bombing by NATO forces of Yugoslavia by reason of the situation
in Kosovo). This is the type of intervention most clearly requiring the applica-
bility of the laws of armed conflict. But what laws?
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6. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07,
JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (1995).
7. In September 1992 the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced that
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina “would follow normal peace-keeping rules of
engagement [and] would thus be authorized to use force in self-defense. . . . It is to be noted that
in this context self-defense is deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by
force to prevent UN troops from carrying out their mandate.” Cited by LESLIE GREEN, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 344 (2d ed. 2000).
The Applicability of the Conventional Laws of Armed Conflict
to Forcible Intervention
We speak more narrowly of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) as “Hague
Law,” since it finds its principal elaboration in the now rather dated Hague
Conventions of 1907. We speak of international humanitarian law (IHL) as
“Geneva Law”, since it derives principally from the Geneva (Red Cross) Con-
ventions of 1949. These two sets of laws, of separate origin in the nineteenth
century and flowing in separate if parallel streams through most of the twenti-
eth century, were brought together in one stream and updated in Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977.8 Those Proto-
cols have since been widely (although not universally) ratified. It is now usual
to speak of “the law of armed conflict” and “international humanitarian law”
interchangeably. Either expression generally includes the other.
What is the threshold of application of these laws? The Hague Conventions
are silent on the point, assuming that their application to “war” was objectively
ascertainable by reason of a declaration to that effect by one or more parties.
The Charter of the United Nations no longer envisages declarations of war as a
right of States and restricts the use of force by States against other States to sit-
uations of self-defense and actions authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter. (Some also believe that there is a limited range of
uses of armed force which are not prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter,
such as “humanitarian intervention.”) Hence, the UN Charter does not estab-
lish a definition of a state of war or armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions of
1949, however, adopted soon after the creation of the United Nations, do es-
tablish a threshold in general terms, a threshold that is also adopted in Proto-
col I. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention[s] shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
. . .
The Convention[s] shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of




8. Protocol I and Protocol II, supra note 3.
9. See Article 2 in each of the four Geneva Conventions, supra note 2.
The threshold of application of the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol I is
thus not set high: it merely requires the objective existence of an “armed con-
flict,” which presumably exists from the first moment after an exchange of
fire.
The Conventions and Protocol I apply between “the Contracting Parties.”
Can the United Nations, as such, be a Contracting Party? Following the Advi-
sory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Reparations for In-
juries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case,10 the United Nations
could, if it chose, become a party to such conventions. But it has not done so
for reasons to be discussed further below. The national contingents of UN
forces participating in an armed conflict would, however, be bound by the
conventions to which their States are parties.
It is also necessary to note that under the Geneva Conventions and Proto-
col I they may apply between Contracting Parties and other parties to the con-
flict which are not represented by a government or an authority recognized by
the adverse party. These latter forces must, however, “be subject to an inter-
nal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.”11 Essentially this
means voluntary de facto compliance by a entity not competent to become a
Contracting Party to the Conventions, which—if offered—must be recipro-
cated. More formal status, however, is accorded by Protocol I, Article 96(3) to
the particular case of an “authority representing a people engaged against a
High Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 4 [self-determination struggles against colonial, alien, or rac-
ist regimes]” provided that the authority undertakes to apply the Conventions
and the Protocol by means of a declaration addressed to the depositary (the
Swiss Federal Council).
So far as non-international armed conflicts (civil wars) are concerned,
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions similarly refers merely to the
objective existence of an armed conflict, and applies as between “the parties
to the conflict,” an expression distinct from, and wider than, “Contracting
Parties.” Protocol II supplements this by defining such a conflict in terms of
the parties being the armed forces of the Contracting Party in whose terri-
tory the conflict takes place and “dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
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10. 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
11. Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 43.
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operation and to implement this Protocol.” Thus, police-type actions
against armed individuals or bands that do not fulfill these conditions do not
engage the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or
Protocol II.
As can be seen, there are a number of issues of interpretation and applica-
tion of the above instruments to particular situations. Notwithstanding these,
one must always remember the Martens Clause and the growing body of cus-
tomary law of armed conflict and human rights law as relevant sources of law
to apply to any situation.
The United Nations and International Conventions Relating to
Armed Conflict
The United Nations is not, as an international personality in its own right,
a party to any of the conventions relating to armed conflict. It is sometimes
suggested that it should become a party. This, however, could impede its
peacekeeping missions. The problem is the threshold of application of the
conventions. There are situations in peacekeeping, especially those that re-
quire—or come to require—“robust” measures, that may cross the threshold,
but it may be undesirable for the operation to “change gears” notionally from a
peacekeeping mission into an armed conflict. This could well be escalatory in
effect. Moreover, there would be something odd about a situation in which
the United Nations, in the name of the international community, is conduct-
ing an essentially peaceful operation in accordance with the United Nations
Charter, which could be characterized nonetheless as an “armed conflict” in
which United Nations forces and opposed forces are equally “combatants.” It
has rightly been suggested that the threshold of armed conflict must be set
higher than that set by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols where United
Nations peacekeeping operations are concerned.12
Notwithstanding that understandable view, the United Nations has consis-
tently taken the view that “the principles and spirit of general international
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12. JOSEPH BIALKE, UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS: THE APPLICABLE NORMS AND
THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, LL.M thesis, University of Iowa College
of Law, published by Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Technical Information
Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, AD No. ADA380930 (2000); Joseph Bialke, United Nations Peace
Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict, 50 AIR FORCE LAW
REVIEW 1 (2001).
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel” shall be observed
by forces participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations.13 This, of
course, is to underline the fundamental consideration that the absence of for-
mal applicability of the laws of armed conflict/international humanitarian law
does not open up a vacuum in which no laws apply.
It might stick in the throats of right-thinking people that there should be an
equality of arms (and the equal moral stature that might be implied by the for-
mal applicability of international conventions relevant to armed conflict) in
the case of enforcement actions carried out under the authority of the United
Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. After all,
in such a case there is a party clearly identified by the Security Council as be-
ing in the wrong, and United Nations forces are being deployed to right that
wrong. That, however, would be a wrong approach, if it led to the proposition
that the conventions could not apply. Both the law of armed conflict and in-
ternational humanitarian law have throughout their development been con-
sistently agnostic so far as the rightness or wrongness of a belligerent party’s
position is concerned. The jus in bello applies equally among the parties how-
ever strong or weak their claims may be to have the right to resort to force un-
der the jus ad bellum. And of course that must be so, otherwise the conflict
could be fought without restraint.
Peace enforcement personnel acting on behalf of the United Nations are
essentially engaged in hostilities as belligerents and “are treated in exactly the
same way as the armed forces of a state.”14 Looked at from the practical point
of view, as Professor Greenwood has remarked, if those laws did not apply
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13. In 1991 the United Nations formulated a Model Participation Agreement, to be concluded
between itself and Member States contributing forces, to be used in peacekeeping operations.
Paragraph 28 of the Model Agreement provides:
[The United Nations peacekeeping forces] shall observe and respect the principles and
the spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military
personnel. The international conventions referred to above include the four Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 and the
UNESCO Convention of 14 May 1954 on the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict. [The participating State] shall therefore ensure that the
members of its national contingent serving with [the UN peacekeeping force] be fully
acquainted with the principles and spirit of the Conventions.
U.N. DOC. A/46/185 (1991).
14. Christopher Greenwood, Protection of peacekeepers: the legal regime, 7 DUKE JOURNAL OF
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 185, 189 (1996).
then a commander of the force opposed to the UN force could well conclude
that he “might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb.”15
The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
The difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations is
clearly marked by the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Asso-
ciated Personnel, adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature
on December 9, 1994.16 The convention applies to protect military, police or
civilian personnel engaged or deployed in a “United Nations operation.” It is
made a crime for any person to murder, kidnap, or otherwise attack personnel
so engaged or deployed. The convention provides for quasi-universal jurisdic-
tion over offenders.17 The term “United Nations operation” is defined to
mean:
[A]n operation established by the competent organ of the United Nations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and conducted under
United Nations authority and control:
where the operation is for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international
peace and security; or
where the Security Council or the General Assembly has declared, for the
purposes of this Convention, that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of
the personnel participating in the operation.
Thus there is no “equality of arms” between UN personnel and others in peace-
keeping operations authorized under what Secretary-General Dag Hammar-
skjold, referring to the situation in the Congo, once dubbed “Chapter VI and a
half”—even “robust” ones under what some others have dubbed “Chapter VI




16. 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 482 (1995). Note also the protection of
peacekeepers contained in Protocol I (1977), art. 37(1)(d), supra note 3.
17. By “quasi-universal jurisdiction” is meant jurisdiction of a pattern common in modern
conventions creating international crimes (aircraft hijacking, torture, etc.) which provide that
any State may exercise jurisdiction over offenders in accordance with its national law. If a
suspected offender is in the territory of any contracting State, that State must either prosecute
the offender itself or extradite to a State competent and willing to prosecute: aut dedere aut
judicare. It is not truly universal jurisdiction as in the case of piracy.
Nations is that “the principles and the spirit of the general conventions appli-
cable to the conduct of military personnel” apply to those operations.
In relation to peace enforcement operations the situation is different. Arti-
cle 2(2) of the Convention provides:
This Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by
the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as
combatants against organized armed forces and to which the law of
international armed conflict applies.
This provision thus indirectly recognizes that while the principles and spirit
of LOAC/IHL apply to peacekeeping, the letter of that law applies to peace
enforcement.
The UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin of 1999
On August 6, 1999 the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued a
Bulletin entitled “Observance by United Nations forces of international
humanitarian law.”18 In this document one can discern that United Nations
parlance has come out of the shadows of “the principles and spirit” formula
and has embraced “international humanitarian law” as such, which the docu-
ment then proceeds to summarize in substance (sections 5 to 9). These sec-
tions are “promulgated” by the Secretary-General “for the purpose of setting
out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law appli-
cable to UN forces conducting operations under United Nations command
and control.”
It will be noted that these principles and rules apply only to UN forces
“conducting operations under United Nations command and control.” While
this covers most UN peace operations, it would not have applied in the case of
Iraq, where the Security Council approved the operations of a “coalition of
the able and willing,” led by the United States, acting in support of the right to
self-defense of Kuwait. Nor does it apply to current operations in the Balkans,
which have been approved by the UN Security Council but the command of
which has been entrusted to NATO.
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18. Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law, Secretary-General’s
Bulletin, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999), reprinted in 2 YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 563 (1999).
The statement in Section 1 of the Bulletin—“Field of application”—is of
importance. It provides:
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set
out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in
situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged as combatants, to the
extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly
applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use
of force is permitted in self-defence.
1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of
members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants,
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the law of
armed conflict.
There are some possible problems of interpretation of the first paragraph of
this provision. In the first place, one wonders whether, in the course of a single
operation, UN forces can move in and out of “situations of armed conflict”
and “engagement” as the paragraph implies. Thresholds of application are not
so neatly marked in situations of the kind likely to be encountered. In the sec-
ond place, rather than to search for some more polite and more exact defini-
tion of “robust peacekeeping,” such situations are described as “peacekeeping
operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.” Just as self-de-
fense is described in the UN Charter, Article 51, as an “inherent” right of
States, it is also in all major legal systems of the world an inherent right of indi-
viduals to use necessary, proportionate and reasonable force in personal
self-defense. The right of members of UN forces to use force in immediate per-
sonal and unit self-defense in all operations should be assumed; it should not
be used in order to characterize a particular type of operation.
Conclusions
While the difference between interventions authorized by the United Na-
tions and those not so authorized may have everything to do with the debate
regarding the jus ad bellum—the right to use force—it is, for all the reasons
given above, not relevant to the jus in bello—the law applicable in armed con-
flict. Whether an intervention is carried out under the authority of the United
Nations, or by a single State, or by a coalition of States (e.g., NATO) without
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the authority of the United Nations, the participants are equally bound by the
law of armed conflict.
The effect of the various statements and documents discussed above re-
garding the applicability of the law of armed conflict and international hu-
manitarian law to forces acting under the authority of the United Nations is to
make the entire corpus of that law, as presently understood to represent cus-
tomary international law, applicable. National contingents may, in addition,
apply various rules and interpretations of that law contained in conventions
binding on them (notably Protocol I) that may not have reached customary
law status. In the interests of consistency in adopting combined rules of en-
gagement among the participating forces and for the avoidance of disagree-
ment, US forces acting against Iraq in 1991 applied certain of the provisions of
Protocol I de facto, even though that instrument has not been ratified by the
United States.
The application of the law relating to armed conflict is not a difficult matter,
at least for most of the armed forces of the world likely to contribute forces to
UN operations. They are trained constantly in their use, secured through rules
of engagement. It would be difficult indeed for them to act in any other way.
Michael Ignatieff has recently observed that “legal constraints are neces-
sary if wars are to preserve public support. The real problem with the entry of
lawyers into the prosecution of warfare is that it encourages the illusion that
war is clean if the lawyers say so. A further illusion is that if we play by the
rules, the enemy will too.” Then, after describing the way in which Serbian
forces behaved in Kosovo, he concludes: “The lesson is clear: it is a form of
hubris to suppose that the way we choose to wage a war will determine how
the other side fights. Our choice to wage ‘clean’ war may result in wars of ex-
ceptional dirtiness.”19 That may be so, but neither public opinion nor the
training and instincts of modern armed forces in civilized countries would
have it any other way.
The real problem may lie elsewhere. It lies not so much in the observance of
the laws of armed conflict as in the manner of conducting operations. The
problems of discrimination in targeting, illustrated by certain tragic errors in
the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, do not result in any sense from a
desire to ignore or avoid the law, but may have more to do with the tendency
of forces, especially Western forces, to be averse to taking casualties. As an-
other writer has observed: “In recent years the key results of these concerns
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19. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND 200 (2000).
for the military have been rules of engagement and force-protection direc-
tives—designed largely to protect political and military leaders from recrimi-
nations that often follow casualties.”20 “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.”
But human sentiment, and public opinion, may be less understanding when a
life is lost in the course of nasty wars between other peoples. To die, or suffer
injury, for the human rights of other people is indeed a noble, even heroic, act.
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20. John Gentry, Complex Civil-Military Operations: A U.S. Military-centric Perspective, 53
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 57, 61 (2000).
